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Abstract—Due to the environmental impacts and economic 
benefits, establishment of business strategies for sustainable 
development is getting increasing attention both in industry as 
well as in academia. In order to improve the corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), we develop an Extend Producer 
Responsibility (EPR) model which refers to original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) takeback in a closed-loop supply chain 
system under incentive-dependent demand and return. The 
performance analysis of the system dynamics simulation model 
will indicate that the inclusion of incentive offer enhances the 
demand, collection and remanufacturing process. A numerical 
example and sensitivity analysis on the optimal results are 
presented to validate the proposed model. Finally, this study 
show insight on how incentive offer increases remanufacturing 
activity and the manufacturers' profits.  
Keywords— CSR; Closed-loop supply chain; Incentive Offers; 
EPR; OEM 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the concept and practices of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) have been widely discussed. CSR will 
become crucial guidelines for various enterprises in the 
future, and most international enterprises already pay 
substantial attention to it. According to the Economist 
(2005), more than 85% of senior managers worldwide and 
65 crucial investors considered CSR to be a crucial factor 
influencing their future investment choices. Generally, 
corporate sustainability comprises three dimensions: 
economic development, environmental protection, and 
social responsibility. Enterprises typically facilitate 
economic growth by emphasizing profits and earnings, cost-
saving, and research and development innovations. 
Regarding environmental protection, enterprises employ 
environmental pollution prevention management when 
using natural resources with the aim of reducing 
environmental damage.  
Governments have also attempted to achieve 
environmental–economic sustainability by introducing  
incentive mechanisms that encourage energy conservation 
and carbon reduction. Lastly, enterprises seek to improve 
their image through corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
activities that concern their labor force, their consumers, the 
environment, charities, and disadvantaged groups.  
CSR promotes business practices that conform to social 
morality, emphasizing the responsibilities of an enterprise to 
stakeholders and not only its own shareholders. These 
stakeholders include any individuals and groups who are 
influenced by a company’s corporate decisions and actions, 
such as employees, customers, suppliers, communities, 
parent companies or subsidiaries, partners, investors, 
shareholders, and other indirect consumers. Therefore, CSR 
refers to business operations that not only comply with or 
exceed moral, legal, and public standards, but that also take 
into account the impact they have on all relevant 
stakeholders. CSR is based on the notion that business 
operations must be consistent with sustainable development, 
and that enterprises should contemplate their effect on 
society and the environment in addition to considering their 
own financial and operational conditions. 
Extended producer responsibility (EPR) is increasingly 
emphasized by manufacturing enterprises to improve eco-
efficiency and to satisfy the growing environmental 
requirements expected in the market. EPR is a policy 
measure that recognizes the producer’s role in reducing the 
impacts of their product throughout its entire life cycle, 
including waste management or recovery at end-of-life. 
EPR policies shift part, or all, of this responsibility from 
taxpayers, local authorities and conventional waste dealers 
to the producers. Effectively designed EPR programs can 
influence the development of more sustainable materials 
management systems and encourage design for environment 
practices such as dematerialization, the elimination of 
toxics, and the reuse of products and packaging. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) defines Extended Producer 
Responsibility as ‘‘an environmental policy approach in 
which a producer’s responsibility, physical and/or financial, 
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for a product is extended to the post-consumer stage of a 
product’s life cycle’’ [9]. This approach maintains that the 
producers have the greatest ability to realize environmental 
improvements and to influence changes in the upstream, 
manufacturing, and downstream phases of a product’s life 
[14]. The extension of producer responsibilities (beyond 
sales and distribution) is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. EPR encompasses both the upstream and 
downstream stages of a product’s life cycle. [13] 
EPR itself can be considered an environmental strategy. 
The choice of policy instruments defines the character of the 
implemented EPR (see Table 1 for examples of policy 
instruments). The efficiency of EPR is dependent upon the 
choice of policy instrument. The different characteristics 
can be classified into five types of EPR, as summarized in 
Fig. 2.  
 




Fig. 2. Different types of EPR. [7] 
 Informative responsibility implies a responsibility to 
provide information about the product and its 
environmental effects. This responsibility is based both 
on legal requirements and the producer’s dependence 
on goodwill.  
 Physical responsibility means that the producer is 
required to physically handle the end-of-life 
management.  
 Economic responsibility is when the producer covers 
the whole or an extensive part of the cost associated 
with the end-of-life management.  
 Liability implies that the producer is responsible for all 
damages that a good cause during its life cycle.  
 Owner responsibility is a subset of all the other 
responsibilities. Owner responsibility arises when the 
producer keeps the legal ownership of the good. One 
obvious example is leasing. 
However, minimizing the environmental impact of end-of-
life from a systems point of view requires more than a 
policy to properly manage products when they are no longer 
in use. It requires product and systems design that takes end-
of-life into account. In order to achieve fully the integration 
of product retirement concerns as design considerations, it is 
necessary to feedback and internalize costs and data. 
Specific EPR programs are now being planned and 
implemented in conjunction with these legislative directives. 
In 2000, the European Parliament passed a directive 
requiring its member countries to institute an EPR program 
for end-of-life vehicles [3]. Furthermore, an additional 
directive for Waste Electronics and Electrical Equipment 
(WEEE) is expected to be approved in early 2003. This is 
not only a European phenomenon, as, for example, Japan 
has also enacted an EPR law covering four large electrical 
home appliances (TV sets, refrigerators, air conditioners, 
and washing machines) [12]. 
Green supply chain management focuses on inter-
organizational efforts in managing the supply chain 
processes to reduce adverse environmental impact from 
purchasing of materials, production, to distribution of 
finished products [10]. Green purchasing can be considered 
as one of the major processes of green supply chain 
management. As EPR manages residual values of returned 
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products, green purchasing takes account of organizational 
sourcing decision with a focus on reducing use of 
environmentally unsustainable materials by developing 
purchasing policy, defining environmental objectives, and 
monitoring performance of suppliers [1, 15]. 
EPR is different from the concept of organizational 
environmental management that is confined to 
organizational efforts and practices to reduce their adverse 
environmental impact through product and process 
stewardship with an emphasis on reducing liability and costs 
[8]. In comparison to the environmental management 
standard on ISO14000 which is about process control with 
environmental consideration, EPR is concerned with the 
management practices by manufacturing enterprises on 
product take-back, recycling, and final disposal to reduce 
harms caused by their products to the environment. 
One major goal of EPR is to mitigate the environmental 
damages by reducing disposal to landfill at the end of a 
product life. There are also economic values of EPR 
practices for manufacturers to collect and process the 
returned products through which to capture the residual 
values by remanufacturing, reprocessing, recycling, and 
reusing the reusable components. The return product 
streams cover packaging, electrical appliances and 
electronics, batteries, used oil, tires, and end-of-life 
vehicles. A major element of any EPR policy is the take-
back requirement mandating individual manufacturers to 
collect and treat the resultant waste.  
Alternatively, product manufacturers are charged with 
financial obligations for these take-back activities. It is 
highly desirable that manufacturers incorporate 
environmental consideration at the product design stage to 
facilitate their subsequent take-back activities. This product 
stewardship emphasis improves and expedites the treatment 
of returned products [11] because the responsible 
manufacturers need to inspect dissembled parts, separate 
reusable parts, recycle, reprocess, and reuse the reusable 
parts in the product take-back process [2]. This collection of 
EPR practices is expected to enhance the producer's ability 
to competently satisfy both the international and local 
requirements on environmental protection.  
Many manufacturing enterprises in emerging countries 
(e.g., China and Brazil) produce items targeted at global 
markets. At the same time, they must comply with related 
EPR legislations enforced by different governments, e.g., 
European Community Directives on Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment (WEEE), if approval is necessary for 
their products to enter the market. For regulatory 
compliance, manufacturing exporters are required to provide 
a program or system of collecting and processing their 
products sold in the markets. Such requirement aims at 
mitigating the environmental damages caused by 
manufacturers through closing the supply chain loop of their 
products [5, 6]. To undertake this extended responsibility 
needs organizational effort for coordination with 
downstream customers, e.g., retailers and distributors, to 
collect the returned products the local market. It is crucial 
that products are designed and made in such a way that 
makes it easy for the original manufacturers to recycle and 
remanufacture the reusable components throughout the 
product life cycle. 
A closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) is the design, control, 
and operation of a system to maximize value creation over 
the entire life cycle of a product with dynamic recovery of 
value from different types and volumes of returns over time. 
In this study, in a CLSC, OEM (Original Equipment 
Manufacturer) takeback refers to EPR systems in which 
OEM themselves take physical and economic responsibility 
for the products that they have manufactured. Each 
company manages their own demanufacturing facilities in 
which their products are disassembled for remanufacturing, 
recycling, or other environmentally responsible outcomes. 
From the perspective of the objectives of extended producer 
responsibility, OEM takeback would seem likely to work 
quite well.  
Feedback is assured since the manufacturers are simply 
directly responsible for their own products at end-of-life. 
They pay the costs of recovery, and they demanufacture and 
recycle, paying any costs that may arise from these 
activities. To the extent that design changes can improve the 
end-of-life situation for their products, manufacturers are 
incentivized to make those improvements. Since these 
demanufacturing facilities will only be responsible for what 
has been manufactured by one company, they will need to 
learn a relatively small family of products. This will 
promote both efficiencies and feedback. Efficiency will 
benefit because of expertise and specialization, while 
feedback will be gained through the concentration of 
demanufacturing wisdom that should be easily accessible to 
the designer.  
As well, information can flow in both directions, as 
internal design-based data can be used to aid the 
demanufacturing process. Furthermore, the opportunities for 
higher-order, closed-loop reuse and recycling would likely 
be enhanced through an OEM-managed end-of-life system. 
If easy access to potentially reusable parts can encourage the 
development of plans for those components, then OEM 
demanufacturing facilities may have the potential to be 
fertile places. They could collect significant inventories of 
similar parts and have the knowledge and opportunities to 
put them to use.  
The OEM takeback mode of organizing end-of-life 
management seems to be strong in terms of economic and 
information feedback, operational efficiencies, and potential 
for closed-loop recycling. On the other hand, the category is 
not without its disadvantages. OEM-managed 
demanufacturing can be considered to be a highly 
specialized mode. The demanufacturing facilities would 
handle a limited array of products. It is clear that the more 
specialized a recycling centre is, the fewer of them there 
will be — because they will have less supply to recycle. So, 
in the OEM takeback mode, there would be fewer 
demanufacturing centres within a given area to service 
particular products. Viewed from the other vantage point, 
products would have to travel a relatively long distance to 
be recycled.  
This is significant since logistics can account for a large 
portion of recycling costs — as much as 70%. Another 
logistical complication of OEM demanufacturing involves 
the question of product return. There needs to be some way 
to get end-of-life products from consumers back to the 
demanufacturing facilities. This is most complicated for the 
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OEM takeback mode of EPR since there are so many 
different manufacturers. In fact, it seems it would be 
necessary for some other actors to be involved here, such as 
retailers, the government, or a manufacturer’s association. A 
frequently discussed issue related to extended producer 
responsibility is that of orphaned products. When a 
manufacturer ceases to exist before all its products have 
been demanufactured, those products are considered to be 
orphaned. In the case of an OEM-focused EPR system, 
orphans truly have no home. A related issue involves 
imported products. Some EPR schemes assign responsibility 
to importers, but importers may be poorly equipped to 
conduct demanufacturing themselves. While 
demanufacturing may not be a core competency of 
importers, it is not necessarily one for manufacturers, either.  
The smaller a manufacturer is, the more difficult it is for 
them to effectively manage their own end-of-life 
responsibilities. It may seem reasonable for them to 
subcontract this work, but depending on how this is done it 
can potentially dilute the ability to feedback economic costs 
and knowledge. Overall, takeback and recycling of products 
by their original equipment manufacturers seems to be 
viable, but not without challenges. Foremost among these is 
the question of reverse logistics. This, and the low interest 
that some manufacturers may have in becoming 
demanufacturing specialists, leads to the consideration of 
other options, including pooled takeback. 
In this study, we define EPR as management practices 
including take-back, recycling, and final disposal of 
products that are helpful for manufacturing enterprises to 
relieve the environmental burdens bought by their products. 
While EPR focuses on utilizing reusable materials and 
components by incorporating modular design and capturing 
residual values from returned products, EPR is different 
from the notion of green supply chain management, green 
purchasing, and corporate environmental management. It is 
structured as follows: Section 1 reviews the relevant 
literature; Section 2 describes assumptions and notations; 
Section 3 develops the model scenario; Sections 4 presents a 
numerical example and sensitivity analysis, respectively; 
Section 5 concludes the study by describing its contributions 
and limitations and suggesting further research directions. 
2.  Notation and Assumptions 
The following notations are used: 
r: number of collected returns per year 
R: annual demand of the remanufactured product 
iπ :  the probability function of incentive policy for 
consumers' takeback willingness, i = 1, 2, 3 
iθ : qualified rate for the remanufactured product Li, i = 1, 
2, 3   
Hi: sensitivity parameter (>1), i = 1, 2, 3  
maxP : the maximal price of the remanufactured product 
($/unit)  
m: remanufacturing cost per product ($/unit) 
d : disposal cost per product ($/unit) 
g: salvage value per product ($/unit) 
1p : L1 remanufacturing product price ($/unit) 
2p : L2 remanufacturing product price ($/unit) 
3p : L3 remanufacturing product price ($/unit) 
iτ : the implement level of Extend Producer Responsibility (
≤0 ), i = 1, 2, 3 
δ : EPR penalty ($/unit) 
* The superscript representing optimal value 
 
The mathematical models in this study assume the 
following: 
(1) After screening, collected returns can be sorted into 
three quality levels: L1, L2 and L3 
(2) Since the returns are sorted in sequence of three quality 
levels, consequently the qualified rate, iθ , i = 1, 2, 3, 
for three levels is assumed to 10 321 <<<< θθθ . 
(3) The price of the reuse product is assumed to be the 
function of EPR level ( τ ). Let τ⋅+= bapi  for 
1230 ppp <<< . The minimum price is a when 0=τ ; 
the maximum price is pmax when maxττ = . 
 
 
Fig. 3. The price of reuse product increases with EPR 
Level. 
(4) Defective products exist in lot size R and are disposed 
of. 
(5) The selling probability of recycling products decrease 
with the availability. 
(6) The selling probability of recycling products increase 
with the EPR level. 
(7) The return availability is up to consumers' takeback 
willingness, which refer to the incentive policy. 
(8) Down substitution of items is considered, i.e., any 
unsold remanufactured product L1 can be sold at the 
price of L2 and any unsold L2 can be sold at the price of 
L3, and any unsold product must be disposed of. 
(9) The substitution of items has impact on the selling 
probability. It is assumed that 3231 HHH <<< , 
meaning thereby the availability of remanufactured 
products has the most impact on each other. 
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3. Mathematical model  
 
 
Figure 3 shows how reverse manufacturing processes 
behave in a closed-loop supply chain. By OEM takeback, 
original equipment manufacturers implement EPR. At the 
remanufacturing plant, returned and used products to 
environmental protection service industries. are inspected, 
screened, and sorted. And, imperfect products are discarded. 
The incentive programs ensure the producer and consumer 
have greater responsibility for the safe disposal of products. 
Financial incentives offered to product holders or buy-back 
campaigns, influence the quantity of returns and thus, 
numerous companies offer financial incentives to collect 
more used products. To offer the correct incentive amount is 
crucial for a company to ensure a sufficient number of used 
products for remanufacturing.  
 
Fig.4 The probability function of incentive policy refer to 
consumers' takeback willingness 
Assumed that v and u are constant )0( vu ≤< . When 




 is the expected value of 




is the expected value of the incentive policy. Figure 4 shows 
the probability function of incentive policy refer to 















































During remanufacturing, parts must be completely 
disassembled, cleaned, and examined for wear and damage. 
Dilapidated, missing, or non-functioning components are 
replaced with new or rebuilt components. Once inspection 
and replacement are complete, the product is reassembled 
and tested for performance specification compliance. The 
remanufacturer then sells these remanufactured products in 
secondary markets.  
For these recycling products, the probability of sale is a 
decreasing function of availability, thus, not all units will be 
sold. In addition, the substitution of items will impact on the 
selling probability of the original items and each other 
simultaneously. It is assumed that
3231 HHH <<< , meaning 
thereby the availability of remanufactured products has the 
most impact of all. This study determines the optimal selling 
price of recycling products to maximize the 
remanufacturer's profit. 


























where Pmax is the maximal price before the probability of 
sale becomes zero. Hence, demand for remanufactured 


























τ −−−⋅= . 
 
The demand for remanufactured products shows that the 
number of unsold remanufactured products increase 
nonlinearly with availability. The revenue for the sold 
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By computing these above terms, the total profit (TP) is 
constructed by the following formula: the sum of the 
revenue for sold remanufactured products L1, revenue for 
unsold remanufactured products L1, revenue for sold 
remanufactured products L2, the revenue for unsold 
refurbished products L2, and revenue for sold 
remanufactured products L3, and the salvage value for 
unsold remanufactured products L3, and deducted by the 
sum of remanufacturing cost for return products, disposal 
cost for return products, and EPR penalty.  
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10 321 <<<< θθθ  
max3210 ττττ <<<≤  
To solve the price constraints problem, we apply Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) method. The optimal selling price of 
the remanufactured item and the appropriate return subsidy 
can be obtained by deriving the KKT conditions which 
improve the feasible directions. In order to show the 
optimality of the solutions, we shall prove that the profit 
model of the remanufacturer is concave in p1, p2 and p3, and 
satisfies the condition of a Hessian matrix. It is shown in 
Appendix A. 
 
4.  Numerical example and sensitivity analysis 
The theory developed in this study can be illustrated using 
a numerical example, with the following parameters: 
Number of collected returns per year, r 
Annual manufacturing capacity of the remanufacturer, R 
Maximal price of remanufactured product ($/unit), pmax 
Sensitivity parameter, H1 
Sensitivity parameter, H2 
Sensitivity parameter, H3 
Qualified rate for the remanufactured product, 1θ  
Qualified rate for the refurbished product, 2θ  
Qualified rate for the non-refurbished product, 3θ  
Salvage value per product ($/unit), g 
Remanufacturing cost per product ($/unit), m 
Disposal cost per product ($/unit), d  
Substituting into (12) to (15) produces an optimal solution 
with *1p  = 323, 
*
2p = 171, 
*
3p  =48 (
*
1τ  = 152, 
*
2τ = 76, 
and *3τ  =14) and 10
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$78848. For this pricing policy, the optimal values of 1p , 
2p , 3p  and TP for fixed set of parameters Φ = {r, R, pmax, 






3τ  and TP*, 




3τ  and TP* are 
considered when set Φ parameters vary. Tables 2 show the 
sensitivity analysis results when set Φ parameters change by 
between -30% and 30%. Additional results are shown in 
Table 3. From the results, there are several observations 
summarized below. 
(1) Table 3 shows the optimal price for the reuse products 
have nothing to do with their remanufacturing cost. 
(2) As shown in Table 3, percentage profit increase (PPI) 
is the most sensitive to maxτ and 1θ . When maxτ  
decreases or increases by 30%, the value of PPI tends 
to change from -37% to 50%. Other sensitive 
parameters are maxp  and r. When  maxp  and r 
decreases or increases by 30%, the value of PPI tends 
to change from -23% to 29%.  
(3) As shown in Table 3, the value of PPI is the least 
sensitive to parameters H1, H2, and H3. When they 
decrease or increase by 30%, the value of PPI tends to 
change from -0.9% to 0.5%. 
(4) As shown in Table 3, all parameters except m and d, 
are positively correlated with PPI. 
(5) The sensitivity of PPI to Φ parameters is ranked as 
follows: 
maxτ and 1θ : -37% to 50% 
R, r, 2θ and 3θ : -24% to 30% 
g, a, b: -18% to 18% 
H1, H2, and H3: -0.9% to 0.5% 
(6) The managers should take care of the most important 
parameters like maxτ and 1θ , which have a great effect 
upon profits. The maximal price of the 
remanufactured and that of the reuse product are up to 
the returns items. For the reason, managers need to 
decide to what kind return items to be collected. 
5. Conclusions 
This study derives an optimal strategy for recycling 
products in an OEM take-back EPR system. An optimal 
EPR leveling policy was formulated to maximize total profit 
for the remanufacturer. The global optimality of the problem 
proves that the profit function is strictly concave with a 
negative-definite Hessian matrix. Due to the complexity of 
the non-linear problem, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) 
conditions are applied. The sensitivity analysis demonstrates 
that the percentage profit increase (PPI) is extremely 
sensitive to the maximal EPR service level and qualified 
rate of the remanufactured product and least sensitive to 
other sensitivity parameters. This study has examined the 
impact of the changes of EPR maximal level and different 
qualified rates with the EPR strategy. With increase 30% in 
the level of EPR and qualified rate, the total profits tends to 
increase 50%. The proposed model could be used in closed-
loop supply chain EPR systems. Future research could 
extend the model to other reverse logistics systems 
accounting for multiple items and a multiple market 
environment. 
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Table 2. The changed value of parameters  
 Changed % 
Parameter -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 
 
r 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600  
R 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000 13000  
maxp  350 400 450 500 550 600 650 
 
g 7 8 9 10 11 12 13  
1θ  0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 
 
2θ  0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24 0.26 
 
3θ  0.21 0.24 0.27 0.3 0.33 0.36 0.39 
 
a  14 16 18 20 22 24 26  
b  1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6  
1H  2.8 3.2 3.6 4 4.4 4.8 5.2  
2H  2.1 2.4 2.7 3 3.3 3.6 3.9  
3H  1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6  
d  10.5 12 13.5 15 16.5 18 19.5  
m 70 80 90 100 110 120 130  
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*δ and TP* ) of sensitivity analysis 
Parameter 
Changed % 
-30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% -30% 
maxp  254 276 300 323 347 371 393 
176 174 172 171 171 170 170 
48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
7 8 9 10 10 10 11 
60188 65856 72109 78848 86109 93748 101721 
maxτ  299 307 314 323 332 339 349 
124 139 155 171 188 204 221 
48 47 48 48 48 48 48 
5 7 8 10 10 12 13 
49424 58233 68053 78848 90817 103793 118061 
R 318 319 322 323 325 326 328 
 162 164 168 171 174 177 181 
 33 37 43 48 52 57 62 
 7 8 9 10 10 10 11 
 64679 69173 73929 78848 84105 89592 95320 
r 323 323 323 323 323 323 323 
 170 171 171 171 172 172 172 
 47 48 48 48 48 48 48 
 10 10 10 10 9 8 7 
 68170 71622 75232 78848 82649 86449 90249 
a 322 322 323 323 324 324 324 
 168 169 170 171 172 173 173 
 47 47 47 48 48 48 48 
 8 8 9 10 10 10 10 
 68657 71936 72544 78848 82439 86001 89534 
b 323 323 323 323 323 323 323 
 172 171 171 171 171 171 171 
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 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 
 78650 78715 78780 78848 78917 78983 79048 
1θ  314 316 319 323 326 330 333 
 151 158 164 171 178 184 190 
 45 46 47 48 48 48 48 
 6 7 8 10 10 11 12 
 52586 60491 69215 78848 89591 101404 114364 
2θ  333 329 326 323 320 319 317 
 190 182 176 171 166 163 160 
 43 44 46 48 48 48 48 
 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 
 73429 74634 76500 78848 81625 84587 87676 
3θ  323 323 323 323 323 323 323 
 170 171 171 171 171 171 171 
 48 48 48 48 46 45 43 
 8 9 9 10 10 10 10 
 68647 71974 75408 78848 82564 86413 90459 
H1 323 323 323 323 323 323 323 
 172 172 172 171 171 171 170 
 48 48 48 48 48 48 47 
 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 
 78096 78405 78646 78848 79025 79171 79294 
H2 324 323 323 323 323 323 322 
 173 172 172 171 171 170 170 
 48 48 48 48 48 47 47 
 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 
 77709 78176 78543 78848 79118 79343 79542 
H3 323 323 323 323 323 323 323 
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 172 172 172 171 171 171 170 
 48 48 48 48 48 48 47 
 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 
 78096 78405 78646 78848 79025 79171 79294 
g 322 323 323 323 323 323 323 
 170 170 171 171 171 171 171 
 46 47 47 48 48 48 48 
 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 
 74604 75998 77417 78848 80368 81888 83408 
d 323 323 323 323 323 323 323 
 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 
 80558 79988 79418 78848 78301 77759 77218 
m 323 323 323 323 323 322 322 
 172 172 172 171 171 171 169 
 48 48 48 48 48 47 47 
 11 10 10 10 9 8 7 
 102717 94409 86449 78848 71622 64744 57904 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
